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ABSTRACT Undeniably, the economic crisis of 2008 was a critical juncture and a 
stress test for the EU and the Europeanness of its populations and elites. The crisis 
therefore offers an appropriate research setting for addressing two major research 
questions. In the following paragraphs, we first question how optimistic and unified 
the national political elites are towards the EU after the economic crisis of 2008. 
Second, we investigate which factors shape and drive the attitudes towards the EU 
of the national political elites.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of Euroskepticism – its multidimensionality and multifaceted 
causes and effects – are widely discussed in academic research. The process 
involves the advent of EU-exacerbated dilemmas regarding national identities 
and nation-state governance versus the institutions, policies and affiliations of a 
supra-national character. Scholarly interest in the subject of Euroskepticism has 
risen in recent times after more Euroskeptics entered national parliaments and 
the EP, and especially when Brexit started in 2016.
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In parallel, studies that have identified positive attitudes towards the EU, 
support for a more integrated and enlarged Europe, multi-layered subjective 
Europeanization and an expanding sense of ‘Europeanness’ are flourishing, 
supplying rich descriptions and interpretations of the ‘power of attraction’ of 
the EU.  These kinds of studies date back to the end of the Cold War and the 
signing of the Maastricht treaty. They received special impetus during the post-
communist enlargement of the EU and the period of protracted discussions 
regarding the Constitutional treaty of the EU. Empirical evidence implies that 
even the devastating economic crisis of 2008 did not have an unequivocally 
demoralizing impact on such positive appraisals. The results of the French 
presidential election in the summer of 2017, and the first public appearance of 
newly elected president Emanuel Macron to the tune of the EU anthem epitomize 
the vigorous pro-European mood. 
The conceptual frameworks of these two seemingly juxtaposed bodies 
of research (Euroskepticism and positive Europeanness) take into account 
economic, ideological, electoral and socio-cultural elements and explore the 
underlying systemic drivers, thereby going beyond a superficial examination of 
the idiosyncratic features of national populations and elites. 
The economic crisis of 2008 – and the time when this global financial crisis 
hit the EU – represents a particularly pertinent subject for the study of later 
shifts in Europeanness. However, even though the economic crisis of 2008 
was an objective phenomenon (i.e. measurable in time and extent), it also had 
a constructivist dimension (by affecting public opinion, political discourse, 
and political behavior). Recent studies of Euroskepticism have found that 
the economic crisis of 2008, its length, the complexities of the bargaining 
process, and the unpopular nature of the solutions that were applied decreased 
support for the EU and boosted disappointment and disbelief in its mediating 
capacity among various constituencies (De Wilde  – Zurn 2012). For instance, 
Brack and Startin (2015) consider that, because of the economic crisis of 
2008, Euroskepticism has entered the mainstream and is now present across 
Europe at the level of public opinion – among political parties and civil society 
groups, within the EU institutions themselves, and in the media. However, 
other research demonstrates that even though the economic crisis of 2008 in 
the EU catalyzed the politicization of crisis management policies, spurred 
debates about the integration of the Eurozone and polarized opinions about 
the future of the EU it did not necessarily produce an indisputably downward 
trend in the support for the EU (Serricchio et al 2013; Armingeon  – Ceka 
2014; Teney 2016).
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BRIEF REVIEW OF RESEARCH INTO THE 
EUROPEANNESS OF NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITES
Research amply demonstrates that Euroskepticism, as well as positive 
Europeanness, are complex phenomena. This is particularly true for the elites, 
with their significant cognitive capacity and intricate engagement in EU affairs. 
Apprehending the attitudes of political elites is crucial for understanding the 
history and the future prospects of the EU. Indeed, national political elites 
(along with administrative, economic, media and social elites) play the dual role 
of being driving agents of the European integration process, and legitimating 
intermediaries before national citizens (Haller 2008; Sanders et al. 2012). The 
issues of the drivers and the scope of the Europeanness of national political 
elites became even more important after the EU underwent the economic 
crisis of 2008, which profoundly changed national and supranational political 
landscapes. 
For a long time, pro-European, EU-supportive, loyal-to-the-EU sentiments 
and attitudes dominated among national political elites, and consequentially 
paved the way to and secured European unification. Comparative research from 
the pre-2008 crisis demonstrates that the Europeanness of elites is a relatively 
autonomous phenomenon: cues among political, economic and social segments 
of national elites have more impact on the Europeanness of peer elites, while 
the Euroskepticism of the masses has only a very limited effect (Best 2012, pp. 
227-228). Dense national elite networks and strong embeddedness in EU affairs 
specifically drive national elites’ Euroenthusiasm (Ginsberg 2010; Matonytė  – 
Morkevičius 2013). There are also regional differences in the patterns of elites’ 
Europeanness, that depend on imperial and secessionist history (Lazic et al. 
2012), on the length and the role of nation-states in EU building (Best et al. 2012), 
and on EU budget donor versus recipient status (Conti et al. 2010). Analysis of 
selected country cases shows that the positive Europeanness of elites in the post-
2008 crisis context did not undergo universal decline, although it was not crisis-
proof (Vogel  – Teruel 2016). 
Plausibly, the economic crisis of 2008 induced changes in elites’ Europeanness 
and aligned it with the more Euroskeptic views of their national constituencies. 
The crisis necessitated that national and supranational political elites make a 
series of unprecedented decisions, leading to policies of domestic austerity, 
tense bargaining between creditor and debtor countries, and between the 
national governments and supranational organizations (Tsirbas  – Sotiropoulos 
2016; Magalhaes et al. 2016). In this elite-driven crisis-management process, the 
interests of some EU member states appeared to be conflicting and antagonistic, 
thus the efficiency of and trust in mediating EU institutions did not flourish. 
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Yet, given that national elites are embedded into European networks and 
intensively socialize within the EU, the mindsets of national political elites were 
largely impermeable to national electoral grievances, exhibited strong positive 
Europeanness, and supported the supranational European agenda in response 
to 2008 crisis-aggravated problems. Thus, research that identifies trends in 
national political elites’ Europeanness is of particular pertinence and relevance 
in the post-2008 crisis context. 
THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF EUROPEANNESS, 
AND AN ANALYTICAL MODEL  
OF EUROENTHUSIASM 
Support for Europe and its multidimensionality have been widely 
discussed from different angles, using a variety of concepts. The notion 
of subjective Europeanization relates to the growing role of Europe in 
cognitive, affective and normative perceptions and orientations, as well 
as highlights that European citizens nolens volens develop complex 
feelings, expectations and interests towards the EU (Mau  – Verwiebe, 
2010). Researchers distinguish between abstract and concrete, static 
and dynamic elements of support or opposition to the EU (Beaudonnet 
– DiMauro 2012). Europeanists agree that overall support for the EU is 
based on compound stances: affective (such as the sense of belonging or 
identification), cognitive (such as the subjective perceptions and meanings 
attached to the EU) and evaluative (Best et al. 2012). Analysis of the fit 
between theoretical conceptualization and measured attitudes reveals that 
European identity and support for the EU are a complex phenomenon, the 
discrete dimensions of which may engage different logics and produce 
conf licting trends (Beaudonnet  – DiMauro 2012). Different weights are 
assigned to emotional and cognitive factors, and their eventual interplay 
(Lubbers  – Scheepers 2010; Recchi 2014; Teney 2016). In diverse national 
contexts, distinct sets of primordial and civic characteristics of European 
identities have been documented (Göncz  – Lengyel 2009). 
Scholars distinguish several layers of EU-related sentiments and attitudes. 
Drawing on the concept of diffuse and specific support, Matthew Gabel in 1998 
proposed a model of pro-EU stances, grouped along utilitarian and affective 
dimensions, the former shaped by governing authorities and political values, 
and the latter embracing abstract values and commitments to the ideal of an 
integrated Europe. 
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In a study of the post-communist enlargement of the EU, Kopecký and Mudde 
(2002) differentiate between support and opposition for the idea of European 
integration in principle, and attitudes towards the EU as the current embodiment 
of this idea. The authors also draw on a distinction between diffuse and specific 
support, and propose a four-fold classification of attitudes towards the EU. 
Within the concept of diffused support, Kopecký and Mudde distinguish between 
Europhiles, who cherish the idea of European integration, and Europhobes, who 
oppose the entire concept of EU unification. Along the dimension of specific 
support, there are EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. Among the EU-optimists 
there is a continuum of Euroenthusiasts – Europragmatists, which differentiates 
the degree of endorsement for the idea of the EU and the operational ways it 
develops. EU-pessimists may also be located on a continuum, ranging from 
Euroskeptics (who like the abstract idea of the EU but are dissatisfied with its 
functioning), to Eurorejects (who oppose the EU in principle). This four-fold 
classification of attitudes towards the EU has contributed to the abstract-values-
versus-political-strategy debate, showing that European ideology prevails as the 
dominant explanation for positive Europeanness, although political strategy at 
times explains specific forms of support. Even though the terms themselves 
imply the existence of emotional content, Kopecký and Mudde overlook the 
affective side of Europhilia and Europhobia. Further studies have partially 
addressed this omission. 
For instance, the concept of Europeanness developed by Best, Lengyel and 
Verzichelli (2012) comprises the idea that there coexist different dimensions 
of attitudes (emotions, cognitions, evaluations and expectations), and objects 
(institutions, policies, strategies) related to the EU, and that their appreciation 
differs. The emotional aspect of Europeanness captures affective attachment to 
Europe. The cognitive-evaluative dimension of Europeanness reflects concerns 
relative to EU governance (approval or disapproval of current trends). The 
projective dimension of Europeanness captures support for the supranational 
policy development of the EU in the future. 
Extending earlier work on the structure of attitudes towards the EU, 
authors of the most recent study of Europeanness claim that there are at least 
five complementary aspects of attitudes towards the EU: attitudes towards 
its performance and identity, feelings of affection, values of utilitarianism, 
and support for its strengthening (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). The scholars 
consider as utilitarian evaluations of the functioning of the EU and matters 
of strengthening European integration; in contrast, affective attitudes include 
emotional responses, identity-related factors and perceived threats to the nation. 
The authors also underline that negative emotions are important as they convey 
feelings of fear and the threat posed by the EU, and they empirically show that 
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negative affection is very sensitive to economic expectations. Boomgaarden et al. 
2011 demonstrate that a relatively large share of support for Europe depends on 
sentiment, yet the utilitarian dimension (related to the immediate performance 
and the democratic and financial functioning of the EU and its institutions) 
is dominant among European citizens. As to future EU strengthening, 
distinguished as a separate issue, this dimension is also attracting the attention 
of other researchers who observe that, because of the growing politicization of 
the EU, projective stances towards the EU are becoming more salient (Teney 
2016). 
For the purposes of this study, designed to clarify the shift in the attitudes of 
national political elites towards the EU caused by the economic crisis of 2008, 
we consider it important to underline two aspects of Europeanness which are 
under intensive debate, yet which are under-researched in European studies. 
These are the emotional and the projective dimensions of Europeanness.  
As to the first one, the classical definition of social identity refers to the 
part of an individual’s self-concept derived from their knowledge of their 
membership of a social group (or groups), together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership (Tajfel 1978, p. 63). Social identity 
theory acknowledges and underlines the fact that such categorizations breed 
in-group bias and positive emotions. Affectively, collective identities provide 
a sense of pride in and belongingness to a group, and reflect the value of that 
identity to the group member. Authoritative social psychologist Frijda (2007) 
forcefully claims that emotion is in fact what happens when individuals evaluate 
themselves, and when they evaluate the goodness or rightness of organizations 
and collectivities to which they belong and with which they identify. This is why 
emotions are central to understanding collective identities. However, for quite a 
long time the social research of collective identities has followed and reflected 
the fashionable notion of the “cognitive revolution” (Deaux 1996) and ignored 
concerns about affective issues. Therefore, it was natural that identity researchers 
finally addressed the pressing need to integrate emotions into their definitions 
and models. Affective identification is associated with positive feelings about 
one’s membership, including pride, enthusiasm, and a sense of affiliation or 
belongingness (Albert et al. 1998). The direct experience of emotions and the 
personal value of one’s identity comprise affective identification, defined as the 
feeling that individuals experience about themselves in relation to a reference 
category, and the value they place on that reference community. Collective 
identities are not merely cognitive constructions; people also attach varying 
levels of emotional significance to their reference categories, and the affective 
dimension of attachment and identification is prominent. The emergence and 
operation of a particular collective identity means that other identities diminish 
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in relevance and salience. Social identities typically only function as orientation 
markers, and only when they are activated affectively do they transform into 
collective identities. Accordingly, it is not so much normative as emotional 
triggers that ground the choice and expression of a particular collective identity 
(Snow 2001). 
The indicators, which juxtapose national and European sentiments, 
thus, effectively capture the strength, substance and relevance of European 
identification and the prevalence of European interests over national concerns, 
as well as the sense of fairness about European decision-making. Even though 
some research shows that on the level of individual attachment national and 
European identities may coexist (Risse  – Grabowsky 2008; Medrano 2010; 
Kaina et al. 2016), issues of  national pride  and EU fairness play a role in 
the highly relevant contradiction between feelings about national and European 
(i.e. other EU member states’) matters. While the attribution or avowal of all 
identities is interactionally contingent, collective identities tend to be more 
fluid, tentative, and transient than categorically based social identities or 
personal identities (Snow 2001). The malleability of European identity should be 
particularly perceptible through the variable of emotional attachment, observed 
under conditions of critical juncture.
During periods of crisis, the flexibility of the projective dimension of 
Europeanness should also increase. On this point, noting that collective 
identities arise and operate within an interactive context marked by uncertainty 
and power relationships, Emmanuel Castells distinguishes three types of 
identities: legitimizing, resistance, and project (Castells 1997, pp.7-10). 
Legitimizing identities are associated with dominant institutions, whereas 
resistance and project identities represent two competing vectors. Devalued 
collectivities generate identities of resistance. In contrast, project identities 
construct alternative identities and support new systems that valorize rather 
than defy the new identity. Castells emphasizes that this triplet of collective 
identities is interactive and contextually embedded. Applied to Europeanness, 
resistance identity conveys the traditional concerns of the nation state and 
feeds Euroskepticism, while project identity leads to EU strengthening and 
supranational governance. Indeed, some researchers find that support for Europe 
is less justifiable in terms of nation-state based rationality than by expectations 
related to institutional mechanisms that organize preferences at the EU level 
(Best el al 2012). Therefore, the projective dimension of elites’ Europeanness 
is vital. Analysis of support for the delegation of national sovereignty and the 
creation of the supranational layer of EU governance captures the status of the 
triplet of collective identities (distinguishing between status quo-resistance-
and-projective orientations), as elaborated by Castells (1997). The main 
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European institutions (the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, 
and the European Commission) embody legislative powers (national, partisan 
constituencies and the European demos), executive political leadership and 
supranational bureaucratic and technocratic expertise. These institutions could 
not withstand undergoing revision due to the 2008 crisis. Concomitantly, the 
Lisbon treaty (in force since 2009) introduced new institutional dynamics, 
rearranging the relations of the three major political actors on the level of the 
EU: national governments, the EP and the EC. What trends in the development 
of resistance versus project identities has the double trigger (the economic 
crisis of 2008 cum constitutional reform of the EU) engendered among elites? 
Prior to the economic crisis of 2008, the elite perspective was not as nationally 
introverted as one may suspect. Country and regional differences were relevant, 
but support tended overall to skew towards the upper half of the strengthening – 
supranationalization scale (Cotta and Russo 2012). Notably, Germany together 
with the Southern European member states were the main supporters of the 
supranationalization of EU policies, while CEE countries were less in favor 
of deeper policy integration, except in foreign policy (Real-Dato et al.2012). 
The question arises if the economic crisis of 2008 moderated (or inverted) the 
extrovert Europeanness of national elites.
Post-crisis empirical research shows that supranational redistributive policy 
development and integration finds no strong resistance on the EU level; however, 
the positions of different member states are distinctly clustered (Vogel  – Teruel 
2016). The supportive stance of poorer countries and those hit harder by the 
2008 crisis is rational, because of the positive gains that would arise from the 
communitarization of the redistributive policy field, including unified taxation, 
social security and targeted economic assistance. However, the similarly 
enthusiastic attitudes of the German elites appear less justified by utilitarianism 
and more by devotion to the very idea of the EU and the principle of deeper 
integration. Yet, the more reticent stances towards the supranationalization of 
redistributive policies by the CEE elites are still attributable to newly regained 
sovereignty and the willingness to exercise it (Słomczynski – Wesołowski 2010). 
A MODEL OF EUROENTHUSIASM, COMPARATIVE 
DATA FROM NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITES, 2014-2007 
In this research paper that focuses on the effects of 2008 crisis, we find it 
opportune to use the more precise term Euroenthusiasm  – which implies positive 
emotional relations and supportive projective assessment  – instead of the wider 
terms Europeanness or subjective Europeanization that are applicable to long – 
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and medium – time horizons and general dynamic developments. As in Kopecký 
and Mudde (2002), the term Euroenthusiasm captures operational support for 
the EU, and the normative ideal of ever-closer union. Even though Kopecký 
and Mudde underscore the affective dimension, the term Euroenthusiasm 
semantically involves pragmatic calculus and engages emotions. The term 
Euroenthusiasm also conveys comprehensive support and investment in the EU 
and positive future projections.
Our model of Euroenthusiasm underlines two major features. First, we 
emphasize and expand the measurements of the emotional dimension of 
Euroenthusiasm by adding two variables to the core emotional variable of 
“attachment to Europe”. We take into the account the factors of national pride 
and the fairness of EU decision-making. The original model of Europeanness 
(Best et al. 2012) included an assessment of the EU benefits to member states 
as a sign of emotional Europeanness. However, we discount this since attitudes 
towards EU benefits are more general and less time (crisis) sensitive (indeed, 
the question “if your country benefited from EU membership?” generated in 
both 2007 and 2014 around 90% positive responses among all national elites). 
Meanwhile, the variables of national pride and EU fairness are sensitive to 
the temporal specificities of national political and policy-making processes. 
For instance, national elites’ agreement with the statement “those who make 
decisions at the EU level do not take enough account of the interests of 
[country] at stake” in 2007-2009 significantly decreased their support for the 
supranationalization of public policies (Matonytė  – Morkevičius 2013, pp. 162-
163). Moreover, before the crisis of 2008 agreement with the statement “the 
interests of some member states carry too much weight at the EU level” was 
rather insignificant in relation to support for supranational policy governance 
(Matonytė  – Morkevičius 2013, pp. 167). However, it is plausible that the 2008 
crisis might also have exacerbated the feeling that other countries are taking 
advantage of one’s own country hardships (for instance, Germany versus 
Greece). In the dataset from 2014, the question associated with national pride 
“those who make decisions at the EU level do not take enough account of 
the interests of [country] at stake” generated a result of 60/40, while its ratio 
in 2007 was 50/50. Second, instead of employing an equilibrated account of 
retrospective and prospective views, we focus on projective support and 
positive stances towards the future strengthening of the EU institutions and the 
supranationalization of redistributive policies (over 10 years). In our model of 
Euroenthusiasm, we downplay retrospective evaluations and assessments of the 
current situation of the EU as too general, and presumably less susceptible to 
the effects of the crisis. Therefore, we work with a narrow range of indicators 
that tap into the positive and negative emotions generated by the EU, support for 
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the strengthening of EU-level institutions, and the development of supranational 
EU policies. We use the term ‘Euroenthusiasm’ to highlight the emotional 
component of support for the EU and the projective appreciation of the idea of 
an ever-closer union. Yet it should be underlined that the empirical indicators 
also imply pragmatic evaluations and cognitive judgement. 
Drawing on data from IntUne (2007) and ENEC-2014, our study contrasts the 
data from two waves of political elite surveys conducted in nine EU member 
states: two Western European countries (founding or West European states of 
the EU: Germany, France), four SE countries (Italy4, Greece, Portugal and Spain) 
and three CEE countries (Lithuania, Hungary and Bulgaria). Case selection 
for the three reference groups is due to data limitations – only these nine EU 
countries participated in both surveys (Table 1). Sample sizes in individual 
counties are similar (quota of 70 parliamentarians per country, in the cases of 
small parliaments, 50). The total sample size used in the regression analysis is 
N=1349. 
Table 1. Countries and respondent groups
2007
N
Year Region
2014 CEE SE WE
N N N N
Country
Bulgaria 83 53 136 0 0
Hungary 80 57 137 0 0
Lithuania 80 54 134 0 0
France 81 46 0 0 127
Germany 80 70 0 0 150
Greece 90 74 0 164 0
Portugal 80 81 0 161 0
Spain 94 81 0 175 0
Italy 84 81 0 165 0
Total 752 597 407 665 277
The concept of national political elites’ Euroenthusiasm is operationalized as 
an aggregate measurement, with a focus on national political elites’ answers to 
eight questions (See Table 2) grouped into two sub-sets: emotional relation to the 
EU, and projective stances towards the strengthening of EU-level institutions 
and the supranationalization of redistributive policies. The emotional dimension 
of Euroenthusiasm includes three variables that capture individual attachment 
4  Italy is a mixed case, belonging to both WE and SE regions. Yet, objectively, the 2008 economic crisis hit Italy 
in a similarly hard way as other countries in the SE. Even though Italy is a founding member of the EU, in 
terms of geography and culture Italy belongs to the SE region.   
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to the EU (positive emotion) and two sociotropic evaluations (negative emotion 
laden) relating to national pride and the fairness of EU decision-making. The 
projective dimension is measured using five variables: two concerning the 
further strengthening of EU institutions, and three measuring support for the 
supranationalization of taxes, social security and help for EU regions.
Principal component factor analysis revealed that the eight indicators cluster 
into two groups, which in further analysis will be referred to as emotional and 
projective (see Figure 1). The Cronbach’s Alpha of our model of Euroenthusiasm 
is 0,604. 
Figure 1. The emotional and projective components of Euroenthusiasm (factor 
loadings; all countries) (2007 – 2014)
Overall, during 2007-2014 the Euroenthusiasm of national political elites 
underwent recognizable changes (Figure 2). The biggest positive change 
(increase in Euroenthusiasm) occurred in Germany, while the biggest negative 
change (decrease in Euroenthusiasm) occurred in Greece and Hungary. 
Tangible changes occurred in both the emotional and the projective dimensions. 
For example, the emotional dimension of Euroenthusiasm underwent a positive 
(upward) movement in Lithuania, but declined in Spain, Greece and Portugal. As 
for the projective dimension, positive changes prevailed in Germany and Italy, 
and negative in Bulgaria and Hungary. On an aggregate level, Euroenthusiasm 
in 2007-2014 was the most stable among elites in France.
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Figure 2. Changes in Euroenthusiasm (indexes) (2007 – 2014)
As for the regional patterns and the length of EU membership (Figure 3), 
political elites from the West-European EU member states (Germany and France) 
emerged from the crisis more Euroenthusiastic than before it. Meanwhile, 
the emotional Euroenthusiasm of SE elites significantly declined, while their 
projective Euroenthusiasm remained stable. The Euroenthusiasm of CEE elites 
slightly increased on the emotional dimension, but the overall tendency was to a 
decrease because of a tangible drop in projective Euroenthusiasm. 
Figure 3. Changes in Euroenthusiasm by region (WE, SE and CEE) (2007 – 2014)
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As to the extremism of political ideologies (Figure 4), the data show a clear 
tendency: the greater the radicalism of national political elites, the weaker their 
Euroenthusiasm. 
Figure 4. Euroenthusiasm according to extreme versus moderate political views (2007-2014)
*  Recoded 0-10 ideological self – identification scale where 0 represents moderate (center scale) and 5 
represents extreme (extreme left and right) ideological identities
Finally, the descriptive analysis shows that, across Europe, the incumbent 
national political elites throughout 2007-2014 were perceptibly more 
Euroenthusiastic than were representatives from the political opposition 
(Figure 5). The biggest difference between politicians who were in government 
and opposition politicians related to their emotional Euroenthusiasm (0.11 
points), while the difference in projective Euroenthusiasm was rather small 
(0.05 points). 
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Figure 5. Euroenthusiasm by party in power versus opposition (2007 – 2014)
THEORETICAL PREMISES FOR THE CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
OF SHIFTS IN EUROENTHUSIASM, 2007  – 2014
Inspired by the insights from the descriptive statistics, we review arguments 
that go beyond the nation-state level and offer a systemic explanation why and 
in which direction the emotional and projective Euroenthusiasm of national 
political elites might have changed because of the economic crisis of 2008. 
Explanatory variables
Region and length of EU membership and their impact on Euroenthusiasm 
is a very broad and complex subject that includes cultural, historical, social, 
economic and political components. Our descriptive analysis (see Figure 1) 
reveals slightly different patterns of Euroenthusiasm in three regions (WE, SE 
and CEE). The distinction between three EU regions is based on a macro-level 
divide that takes into account the functional integration of national polities, 
economies and social structures. The longer the EU membership (i.e. tenure), 
the greater the integration and presumably the smaller negative effects of the 
economic crisis of 2008. The regional aspect differentiates latecomer CEE 
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countries (relatively poor economies, integrated into the EU in the neo-liberal 
spirit) from SE countries (moderately well off economies, integrated into the 
EU in the 1980s due to social market concerns) and WE countries (the richest 
economies in the EU, who cherish socio-economic solidarity). 
The Cold War created the division between East and West that is reflected 
in the distinct political conflict between CEE versus old(er) EU member-
states relative to European integration, based on different patterns of 
political, economic and cultural development (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003; 
Steenbergen -Marks 2004). More studies are emerging that empirically 
document the legacy of the state-socialist regimes, thereby characterizing 
the post-communist EU member states twenty and more years after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall (Pop-Eleches  – Tucker 2017). According to the 
theory of the varieties of capitalism, CEE countries adopted a specific form 
of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2003, Hay 2004, Schubert et al. 2009). 
Characterized by a liberal state, an economy dependent on foreign direct 
investment and foreign firms, and a technological gap, CEE countries have 
a special type of dependent market economy (Hancké et al. 2007, Nölke  – 
Vliegenthart 2009) in which economic openness and significant exposure 
to internationalization combines with nationalistic values. This paradoxical 
combination of economic globalization and nationalistic values is solidly 
established among the Baltic elites (Steen 2015), but is less sustainable in 
other CEE countries, as the epic drives towards political conservativism in 
Poland and Hungary now indicate. In contrast, earlier studies show that less 
nationally minded and broadly pro-European political elites rule Southern 
member states (Conti et al. 2010). However, the economic growth in both 
the SE region and CEE countries which occurred after their joining the EU 
is based on infrastructural development, often financed by EU transfers 
(Magone 2003, Magone 2011; Ó Beacháin et al. 2012). Objectively, SE 
countries endured the greatest economic hardships during the crisis of 2008. 
Therefore, in SE countries the issue of Europe might have become very 
divisive and produced the strong incentive to increase national ownership 
and control of lives and livelihoods within the EU.  
Meanwhile, CEE countries immediately after their integration into the EU 
stood out as being notoriously reluctant to supranationalize, enjoying their 
recently regained national sovereignty (Słomczynski – Wesołowski 2010). The 
commitment of CEE countries to the principle of ever-closer union appears 
dubious and their attitude towards the EU often confirms Haller’s definition 
(2008) of their instrumental position: “it’s taking part that counts”. The absence 
of clear, deep-seated positive affection for the EU under conditions of critical 
juncture may also ultimately decrease projective Euroenthusiasm. 
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Table 2. Variables and coding
Variable 
Name Measurement/ Coding
Dependent 
variables
Dependent 
variable 
EU 
enthusiasm 
and
2 composite 
sub-indexes 
Euroenthusiasm is a cumulative index containing two sub-indexes reflecting EU support: 
emotional and projective. The cumulative index and the sub-indexes range from 0 to 1 (most 
pro – EU).
Euroenthusiasm sub-index EMOTIONAL (3 variables): 
Attachment to EU (original question: Do you feel very attached, somewhat attached, not 
very attached or not at all attached to the Europe. 1. Very attached, 2. Somewhat attached, 3. 
Not very attached, 4. not at all attached); 
National pride (original question: Those who make decisions at the European Union level 
do not take enough account of the interests of [country] at stake. 1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree 
somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 Strongly disagree);
EU fairness (original question: Interests of some member states carry too much weight 
within EU. 1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree somewhat, 3 Disagree somewhat, 4 Strongly disagree).
Euroenthusiasm sub-index PROJECTIVE (EU institutions and supranational policies) (5 
variables):
Strengthening of the EP (original question: The powers of the European Parliament ought to 
be strengthened 1. Agree strongly, 2. Agree somewhat, 3. Disagree somewhat, 4. Disagree 
strongly);
Strengthening EC (original question: The European Commission ought to become the true 
government of the European Union 1. Agree strongly, 2. Agree somewhat, 3. Disagree 
somewhat, 4. Disagree strongly);
Common taxes (original question: Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 
years, can you tell me whether you are in favor or against of a unified tax system for the 
European Union? 1 Strongly in favor, 2 Somewhat in favor, 3. Somewhat against and 4. 
Strongly against);
Common social security (original question: Thinking about the European Union over the 
next 10 years, can you tell me whether you are in favor or against common system of social 
security? 1 Strongly in favor, 2 Somewhat in favor, 3. Somewhat against and 4. Strongly 
against);
Help for regions (original question: Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 
years, can you tell me whether you are in favor or more help for EU regions in economic 
or social difficulties? 1 Strongly in favor, 2 Somewhat in favor, 3. Somewhat against and 4. 
Strongly against). 
Economy
Perceived 
economy
Perceived economy variable represents the general satisfaction with the economy. 
Based on the change of Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), optimistic periods 
(relative growth of CCI score) coded as 1, negative CCI changes coded as 0. Consumer 
confidence indicator uses selected questions addressed to consumers according to the 
Joint Harmonized EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys. 
Source: European Commission  – Directorate general for economic and financial 
affairs (DG ECFIN): http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm  
(access date: January 6th, 2016).
More details on the consumer confidence indicator as well as long time series can 
be found via the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/
surveys/index_en.htm
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Crisis  Dummy variable for post-crisis 2014 coded as 1; 0 for 2007.
Ideology
Left – Right 
scale self-
identification
Original Question: On a left-right scale where 0 means the left and 10 means the 
right, where would you place yourself?
Political 
radicalism
Political radicalism score represents the level of affinity to left or right ideology. 
The score is a refined left – right scale where the extreme values of the scale (0 
and 10) are re-coded as 5, 1 and 9 re-coded as 4, 2 and 8 re-coded as 3, 3 and 7 
re-coded as 2, 4 and 6 re-coded as 1, and the neutral middle scale 5 recoded as 0.
Electoral 
calculus
Incumbency 
versus 
opposition
Coded 1 for representatives of governing parties and 0 for opposition.
Original question: Party in government at the period of survey.
Election 
period
Coded 1 if country held national parliamentary elections during or one year after 
survey year and 0 if election dates did not correspond with the survey period.
Socialization
EU Tenure 
(Maturity)
Variable represents the length of EU membership.
EU founding countries (Germany, France and Italy) coded as 3, Southern Europe 
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) coded as 2 and Central East European 
countries (Lithuania and Bulgaria) coded as 1.
Professional 
Contacts
Original Question: How frequently, in your political activity, were you in contact 
with actors and institutions of the EU in the last year? 1. At least once a week, 2. 
At least once a month, 3. At least once every three months, 4. At least once last 
year, 5. No contacts last year.
Residence in 
EU
Original Question: Have you ever lived in another European country? (at least 3 
months) 1. Yes, 2. No.
European 
regions in 
2007 and 
2014
Western 
Europe (WE),
 new Southern 
Europe (SE) 
and  Central 
and Eastern  
Europe (CEE)
National political elites’ samples from in 2007 and 2014 Western Europe 
in 2007 and 2014 (France and Germany); Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain) and Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Lithuania). Total sample N= 1349 (N= 752 in 2007 and N=597 in 2014).
In contrast, earlier research shows that elites from Germany and France, 
the leading EU member states, are the stronghold of support for European 
integration (Best et al 2012). The Lisbon treaty, which has since 2009 
intentionally strengthened EU institutions and common policies, was the 
result of the perseverance of German and French politicians. The question is 
if the elites in these countries preserved their staunchly pro-EU stances after 
the crisis. After all, these better off countries might be reluctant to make the 
investment needed to rescue the most crisis-affected countries, and – instead 
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of the long-established, positive-sum-game governance of EU affairs – France 
and Germany might enter a period of multiple zero-sum game playing and re-
nationalization (as another affluent EU member state, the United Kingdom, is 
doing with Brexit). 
H1. Length of EU membership increases Euroenthusiasm.
Socialization in the EU covers the cultural-emotional, professional and 
social components of elites’ experiences and relations to the EU. The idea that 
socialization in the EU might have an effect on values and preferences is drawn 
from Bourdieu’s theory that socializers engage in the exchange and dissemination 
of particular sets of concepts and behavioral dispositions that shape the ways in 
which people feel, think about and act in the world (Checkel 2005). Thanks 
to the power of normative persuasion, socializers adapt and refashion their 
identities and outlooks accordingly. In contrast to strategic calculation, the 
socialization approach implies that attitudes and behavior have a normative 
and emotional basis (Schimmelfennig 2005). Research shows that direct and 
indirect transnational experience and participation in European networks has an 
effect on elites’ Europeanness (Best et al., 2012; Matonytė – Morkevičius 2013). 
Taking into account the regional differences, EU socialization applies primarily 
to newcomers from CEE, since they are expected to absorb the values and habits 
of the WE elites who comprise the ‘Club of Founders’.
H2: EU socialization increases the level of Euroenthusiasm.
A political-ideological variable indicates how ideological mind-sets (left-wing 
versus right-wing preferences) affect Euroenthusiasm. European integration 
is a multi-dimensional process that shapes identification with a polity, affects 
the ideological priorities related to the mechanisms of political representation, 
democratic control, policy scope and the extent of economic redistribution 
(Bartolini 2005, Best et al. 2012). Research reveals that left-leaning elites more 
enthusiastically support the EU than the right-leaning elites (Hooghe et al., 2002; 
Matonytė – Morkevičius 2013). Left-wing parties might oppose EU integration 
because of the neoliberal character of the EU, while right-wing parties out of 
concern for national sovereignty.  
H3. Left-leaning political ideologies positively affect Euroenthusiasm. 
The moderate versus extremist political views variable also taps into the field 
of political culture. The European menu is rich, and different parties choose 
different dishes from it in line with their own agendas and policy priorities 
(Sitter 2001; Neumayer 2008). Only the extreme (marginal) positions are simple, 
while the mainstream parties express a variety of moderate positions. It has been 
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established that the association between a political party’s position on European 
unification and its ideological stance takes the form of an inverted U-shaped 
curve: the further from the center of the left-right axis a party positions itself, 
the likelier it is that it will oppose European integration (Hooghe et. al., 2002; 
Hooghe et al. 2006). Parties on the radical left and the radical right tend to 
be Euroskeptic in order to demarcate themselves from their more moderate 
competitors (Taggart, 1998). 
Because of the economic crisis of 2008, radical populist parties emerged in 
substantial numbers across the EU. However, these parties are not internally 
cohesive, and – referring to Kopecký and Mudde’s terminology (2002) – 
they encompass several factions, including Euroskeptics, Europragmatists 
and Eurorejects. The issue of European integration is very divisive for these 
radical parties. On the one hand, as a means of breaking into the electoral 
market (Rohrschneider -Whitefield 2016) these radical parties have the specific 
incentive to increase their ownership of EU issues, but on the other, they seek to 
offer clear policy stances about sensitive national matters. 
Pre-crisis research shows that political extremism has the biggest (negative) 
impact on Europeanness and that centrist attitudes correlate with stronger 
Europeanness (Best et al. 2012). Given that the economic crisis of 2008 has 
increased the politicization of domestic and EU issues, and that the views of 
national elites might have become more polarized, an increase in the intensity 
of conflict over European integration is to be expected (De Wilde 2011). The 
absorption of European integration into domestic party competition involves the 
type of polarization that is connected to the positions of mainstream or centrist 
parties’ vis-à-vis radical and extreme parties. 
H4. Political extremism negatively affects Euroenthusiasm. 
The variable party in government versus opposition is used to check if 
Euroenthusiasm depends on incumbency and the electoral calendar. Again, since 
the European menu is rich, different parties can choose different combinations of 
options that correspond not only to their ideological preferences, but also conform 
to their short-term strategies on the domestic scene (Neumayer 2008; Dakowska 
2010). Research shows that Euroskepticism is stronger among opposition parties 
(De Vries – Edwards 2009; Taggart 1998). However, with the economic crisis 
of 2008, Euroskepticism has become increasingly mainstream (Meijers 2015; 
Brack  – Startin 2015). Not only have radical and extreme parties increased their 
Euroskepticism, so have several mainstream parties, especially those that are in 
opposition (Conti et al. 2017). Opposition parties do not have the institutional 
baggage of incumbency that creates constraints on policy positions. In an attempt 
to challenge the incumbent government, they might project policy positions that 
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are more Euroskeptic than those of cabinet parties. However, any serious shift 
by the governing parties towards a more anti-EU position would be damaging 
in terms of their public image, as it would raise questions about their credibility 
and capacity as domestic managers and negotiators in intergovernmental 
decision-making at the EU level (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). In addition, strategic 
knowledge might enhance the Euroenthusiasm of government parties. After 
all, strategic knowledge concerns the fit between procedural knowledge and 
contextual information and, in practice, consists of a wide range of matches 
across interlinking contexts: financial, cultural, political, institutional, etc. It 
also provides retrospective coherence and knowledge of emerging properties. 
In contrast, the crisis might have spurred the radicalization of the opposition, 
which – especially at electoral times – could use European issues as an element 
of disagreement with the government and seek to shift blame for hardships to 
the incumbents. However, amidst the growing Euroskepticism of citizens, the 
electoral calculus might reduce the Euroenthusiasm of both incumbent and 
opposition politicians. Therefore, we assume that the representatives of the 
opposition follow less closely the European agenda and have a lower level of 
Euroenthusiasm. 
H5. Incumbency increases Euroenthusiasm.
Economic optimism refers to the theory of political action according to which 
democratic political actors react to changing economic contexts (Downs 1957). 
This implies a utilitarian approach to politics, and leads to the assumption that 
the 2008 crisis has profoundly shattered European and national economies 
and therefore has negatively affected Euroenthusiasm. Pre-crisis studies 
found a positive, but moderate relationship between citizens’ satisfaction with 
the domestic economy and their support for the EU (Lubbers  – Scheepers 
2010). Public opinion data show that the economic crisis of 2008 boosted 
individual self-confidence and intensified feelings of personal well-being and 
satisfaction (Van Deth 2011, pp. 223-238), as well as sharpening the cost-benefit 
evaluation of the EU among ordinary citizens across Europe (Teney 2016). 
Thus, because of the post-crisis saliency of utilitarian approach, we expect that 
Euroenthusiasm will decrease more among the political elites in those countries 
where economic recovery is slower. By identifying a trend towards economic 
optimism, this indicator anticipates the reaction of elites as predicated by the 
economic rationality calculation model: politicians from EU member-states that 
financially are better off are liable to express higher Euroenthusiasm.
H6. Favorable national economic conditions increase the level of 
Euroenthusiasm.
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: RESULTS AND 
INTERPRETATION 
In the remainder of the article, we present the results of the multiple 
regression analyses. The series of regression analyses we present below 
differentiates between the three EU regions (WE, SE and CEE). Following our 
model of Euroenthusiasm that differentiates between emotional and projective 
dimensions, we test the six hypotheses described above. All regression models 
use survey data from the IntUne 2007 and ENEC 2014 datasets, with additional 
data on economic variables and election timing coded and integrated as dummy 
variables. 
Among the CEE elites, the main driver of Euroenthusiasm is the state of the 
economy. The economic crisis negatively affected Euroenthusiasm, especially its 
projective dimension. The effects of the economic crisis and economic optimism 
are insignificant in terms of the emotional component of Euroenthusiasm. 
Incumbent elites in the CEE are systematically more Euroenthusiastic than 
are representatives of the political opposition. The Euroenthusiastic bias of the 
incumbents endures throughout the electoral calendar. In other words, it appears 
that in CEE countries, political opposition does not increase its criticism of the 
EU in electoral campaigns.  
As expected, the left-leaning elites in CEE are slightly more Euroenthusiastic 
(especially in terms of projective Euroenthusiasm). Meanwhile, political 
radicalism does not have a significant effect on elites’ Euroenthusiasm in CEE. 
CEE elites with close working contacts with EU officials and partners are more 
emotionally Euroenthusiastic than those whose European contacts are weaker. 
The factor ‘residence in the EU1’ does not have a significant effect on the 
Euroenthusiasm of CEE elites.  
The economy hugely affects the Euroenthusiasm of political elites in SE. 
During the economic crisis, the Euroenthusiasm of SE elites underwent 
significant decline, especially along the emotional dimension. However, and in 
contrast to the elites in CEE, in the context of economic pessimism, the SE elites 
further support the strengthening of the EU; i.e., their projective Euroenthusiasm 
has not undergone any significant decline.
In SE, incumbent elites are more Euroenthusiastic than are the representatives 
of political opposition. The electoral calendar does not modify this 
Euroenthusiastic bias of SE politicians: i.e., as in CEE, politicians in SE fail to 
increase effectively their criticism of the EU during electoral campaigns. Yet, 
in contrast to the situation in CEE, ideological preferences (left versus right) 
do not shape Euroenthusiasm of SE elites. However, the effects of the political 
extremism of SE elites’ Euroenthusiasm are significant on both emotional and 
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projective terms: moderate elites in SE are significantly more Euroenthusiastic. 
The factors of European socialization are unimportant in the Euroenthusiasm 
of SE elites.   
Euroenthusiasm in WE is mostly driven by political factors, not by the economy. 
Moreover, and counter-intuitively, during the crisis emotional Euroenthusiasm 
slightly but significantly increased among WE elites. The two variables political 
ideologies and political radicalism have significant effects on the Euroenthusiasm 
of WE elites. The impact of ideological preferences is more pronounced and 
it affects both emotional and projective aspects of Euroenthusiasm; however, 
left-leaning elites display significantly higher levels of Euroenthusiasm. The 
effects of political radicalism are smaller, and mostly concern the emotional 
dimension of WE elites’ Euroenthusiasm: politically moderate elites are more 
Euroenthusiastic. The positive effects of incumbency on Euroenthusiasm of WE 
elites are also pronounced: the emotional Euroenthusiasm of the incumbent elites 
is significantly stronger.  In contrast to the case in CEE and SE, the electoral 
calculus drives the Euroenthusiasm of WE elites: in pre-electoral years, the 
projective Euroenthusiasm of WE elites increases. The factors of socialization 
do not exercise a significant effect on the Euroenthusiasm of WE elites.
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Table 3. Regression models for regions of the EU
Region Emotional
Model
Projective Euroenthusiasm
C
E
E
Ec
on
om
y Crisis -0,03 (0,74) -0,20 (0,02) -0,16 (0,06)
Perceived economic -0,03 (0,78) -0,28 (0,00) -0,21 (0,02)
Po
lit
ic
al
 cu
ltu
re
 
Political radicalism 0,07 (0,24) -0,06 (0,30) 0,00 (0,94)
Political ideology -0,02 (0,71) -0,11 (0,04) -0,10 (0,10)
Incumbent 0,12 (0,03) 0,04 (0,43) 0,11 (0,05)
Election period (pre-
election year) -0,01 (0,94) 0,05 (0,64) 0,03 (0,79)
So
ci
al
i-
 
za
tio
n Residence in EU 0,10 (0,11) -0,02 (0,66) 0,05 (0,44)
Contact with EU officials 0,17 (0,01) 0,01 (0,81) 0,12 (0,04)
R 0,25 0,37 0,33
R square 0,06 0,14 0,11
SE
Ec
on
om
y Crisis -0,33 (0,00) -0,01 (0,86) -0,22 (0,00)
Perceived economic 0,27 (0,00) 0,08 (0,13) 0,22 (0,00)
Po
lit
ic
al
 cu
ltu
re Political radicalism -0,16 (0,00) -0,14 (0,00) -0,19 (0,00)
Political ideology -0,05 (0,26) -0,07 (0,15) -0,08 (0,09)
Incumbent 0,26 (0,00) 0,18 (0,00) 0,28 (0,00)
Election period (pre-
election year) -0,06 (0,13) -0,06 (0,20) -0,08 (0,07)
So
ci
al
i-
 
za
tio
n Residence in EU 0,05 (0,24) 0,04 (0,37) 0,06 (0,18)
Contact with EU officials 0,06 (0,11) -0,01 (0,88) 0,04 (0,36)
R 0,45 0,26 0,43
R square 0,21 0,07 0,18
W
E
Ec
on
om
y Crisis 0,19 (0,04) 0,04 (0,65) 0,15 (0,07)
Perceived economic 0,06 (0,44) -0,07 (0,35) 0,00 (0,96)
Po
lit
ic
al
 
cu
ltu
re
Political radicalism -0,19 (0,01) -0,01 (0,84) -0,14 (0,04)
Perceived ideological 
identity -0,18 (0,01) -0,39 (0,00) -0,37 (0,00)
Incumbent 0,27 (0,00) 0,11 (0,12) 0,25 (0,00)
Election period 
(pre-election year) 0,09 (0,27) 0,23 (0,00) 0,20 (0,01)
So
ci
al
i-
 
za
tio
n Residence in EU 0,11 (0,09) 0,03 (0,62) 0,10 (0,13)
Contact with EU officials -0,06 (0,40) 0,01 (0,89) -0,03 (0,61)
R 0,39 0,40 0,44
R square 0,15 0,16 0,19
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The findings show that regional differences produce different patterns of 
national elite Euroenthusiasm. The regions CEE, SE and WE vary greatly in 
terms of the changes in their elites’ Euroenthusiasm during 2007-2014. The 
stress test of the economic crisis of 2008 reveals that regional histories and past 
legacies matter. Elites’ Euroenthusiasm is positively affected by the length of 
EU membership (elites in WE are perceptibly more Euroenthusiastic than are 
elites in SE who are more Euroenthusiastic than their peers in CEE). During the 
2008 crisis, the long-standing engagement of the EU founding states stabilized 
positive projective stances of their elites towards the EU. In contrast, in SE – 
with social-market-oriented legacies of integration into the EU -, the projective 
appreciation of EU strengthening and support for the supranationalization of its 
policies was shattered by the 2008 crisis. As for CEE elites, who are anchored 
within the neo-liberal framework of thought and an economic-efficiency-
oriented style of management, the 2008 crisis did not create significant barriers 
to their projective support for further strengthening of the EU and the increasing 
supranationalization of its governance.  
In parallel, we observe that only in the cases of the less-developed market 
economies of SE and CEE are the economic crisis of 2008 per se and perceived 
economic factors (the economic optimism or pessimism of the population) strong 
predictors of the changes of elites’ Euroenthusiasm. In latecomer EU member-
states from CEE, economic factors mostly affect the projective dimensions of 
elites’ Euroenthusiasm, corresponding to the pragmatic interest-driven EU 
membership of post-communist countries, as observed by Haller (2008), and the 
more stable positive emotional texture of Euroenthusiasm that may be inferred 
from Gabel (1998). Findings showing that economic pessimism lowers support 
for the supranationalization of redistributive policies and leads to the resurgence 
of the nation-state are in tune with predictions about the economic theory of 
politics (Downs 1957), and also indicate decreasing support for current political 
authorities and projects when the economic outlook is poor. In SE, economic 
factors have strong repercussions on the emotional dimension of elites’ 
Euroenthusiasm, and this trend somewhat contradicts the pattern observed in 
CEE. However, these findings corroborate the idea that the style of management 
of the economic crisis of 2008 could have had effects not so much on cost-benefit 
calculations, but on the production of strong negative emotions, reflecting the 
hurt feelings of the nation-state and the judgement that EU decision-making 
is unfair in relation to some countries. The case of SE, with its considerable 
decrease in emotional Euroenthusiasm driven by the ailing economy, also 
illustrates the importance of the emotional features of a resistance identity, 
described by Castells in 1997. Economic indicators are not of any significance 
for WE elites’ Euroenthusiasm, the region with the highest level of economic 
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development and with the objectively strongest resilience to the economic 
crisis of 2008. Thus, our research demonstrates that national economies have 
regionally patterned impacts on national elites’ Euroenthusiasm. It appears that 
WE elites (and citizens whose economic optimism is measured) can de-couple 
their assessment of the national economic situation from their Euroenthusiasm. 
In WE, where the economies are most mature, economic factors play only a 
minimal role in Euroenthusiasm and leave ample space for the effects of political 
culture. 
The effects of European socialization on national elites’ Euroenthusiasm 
also lend themselves to interpretation by region. It is in newcomer CEE where 
networking and communication with European colleagues has a significant 
effect on elites’ Euroenthusiasm. The Euroenthusiasm of the elite of CEE, 
these individuals having had relatively short exposure to Europe, is perceptibly 
impacted by their European contacts, and those CEE elites who have denser 
European networks and intensive contact with the representatives of the EU 
are more Euroenthusiastic. This finding is also in line with the phenomenon of 
strategic knowledge that underlies the positive effects of having insider status. 
Yet in SE and WE, where at least one generation of politicians has already 
been born and raised in the EU, European socialization does not play such an 
important role and is a simple ‘fact of life’. 
The greatest regional differences in changes and the plasticity of national 
elites’ Euroenthusiasm are mediated through the effects of variables related to 
types of political culture. First, the difference between incumbent politicians 
versus opposition is significant in all three regions. These findings agree with 
the strategic-knowledge-based argument that insiders (i.e., committed and 
responsible decision-makers) possess up-to-date information that is more 
complete and more binding than that of outsiders. It also highlights the persistence 
of ‘Eurelitism’; i.e., the phenomenon of elites who are not very sensitive to 
popular grievances yet who primarily drive the European project: across the 
board, incumbents display significantly higher levels of Euroenthusiasm than 
their political opponents do. 
As is known, in all EU member states the attitude of the public towards the EU 
is less supportive than that of the elite. Consequently, mirroring the public voice 
is a strategic move that can secure popularity and increase the attractiveness 
of the opposition who seek to win more votes. However, the existence of pre-
electoral effects that diminish the government versus opposition divide, and 
tune all political candidates in to the public voice are found only among elites in 
WE. This finding might be interpreted as a sign that in WE the political culture 
of responsive governments is strongly developed, making political candidates 
sensitive to their voters (among whom Euroskepticism is increasing). The 
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finding that the WE incumbents and the opposition elites adjust their stances 
towards the EU during national electoral campaigns also implies that in WE 
the EU thematic is largely employed during national electoral campaigns. 
In contrast, electoral effects cannot be observed among CEE and SE elites, 
apparently leading to much less Europeanized national electoral campaigns, 
and less responsivity to the increasing Euroskepticism of their constituencies.  
Regionally patterned political cultures are also displayed in the differentiated 
impact of political ideology and political radicalism on the Euroenthusiasm 
of national elites. In general, our findings corroborate and develop Kopecký 
and Mudde’s (2002) insights that the ideological dimension is dominant in 
Euroenthusiasm, although political strategy (here, pre-electoral calculus, 
political radicalism and incumbency) at times plays a role. Political ideology 
is systematically found to significantly affect the emotional and projective 
dimensions of Euroenthusiasm only in the case of the consolidated and mature 
democracies of WE, where leftist elites score higher on this dimension than 
right-wing oriented elites. The effects of ideological self-identification are 
also significant on the projective Euroenthusiasm of CEE elites, among whom 
those who hold left-leaning attitudes have higher Euroenthusiasm, as is fully 
compatible with expectations that left-wing politicians are more supranationally 
oriented and less concerned with the issues of national sovereignty that 
dwindle during the process of Europeanization. The political-ideological 
substrate is irrelevant for the Euroenthusiasm of SE elites, most probably 
due to the numerous government crises and tumultuous experiences of crisis 
management in this particular region, where post-crisis shifts in the political 
landscape are the most visible (Tsirbas – Sotiropoulos 2016; Magalhaes et al. 
2016; Conti et al. 2017). In contrast, in SE political radicalism has a strong hold 
on both dimensions of national elites’ Euroenthusiasm. The effects of political 
radicalism on the Euroenthusiasm of WE elites are smaller and visible only in 
the emotional dimension. Political radicalism among the national elites of CEE is 
negligible, and fails to produce any significant effects on their Euroenthusiasm. 
Indirectly but persuasively, these observations, pertinent to the Euroenthusiasm 
of national elites, amply illustrate the specificities of regional political cultures 
in the EU. WE has the most complex political culture, where national elites’ 
electoral calculus, political ideologies, and political radicalism are profoundly 
intertwined and thoroughly related to their Euroenthusiasm. In contrast, after 
the 2008 crisis the SE elites’ Euroenthusiasm (in terms of the variables of 
political culture) appears to be largely unidimensional and mostly dependent 
on political radicalism. Meanwhile, the Euroenthusiasm of CEE elites has very 
shallow roots in political culture – some aspects of Euroenthusiasm depend on 
political ideologies, but the relationship is quite spurious. These findings partly 
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corroborate the claim to the absence of deep ideological political discussion and 
incumbent-opposition power conflict relative to the EU in this post-communist 
region which borders conflict-hungry Russia, and which struggles with major 
challenges (notwithstanding the effects of the crisis of 2008) that are posed by 
on-going socio-economic structural reforms.
In the three regions, the difference in effect of the emotional versus projective 
dimension are substantial: among CEE elites more malleable is the projective 
dimension of Euroenthusiasm; among SE elites are found the more emotional and 
the most balanced effects, while WE elites tap into both emotional and projective 
dimensions of Euroenthusiasm. As the theory of emotions (Frijda 2007) predicts, 
sentiment-based judgements crystalize over time and are more enduring if new 
negative emotions do not shatter them profoundly. In chronological terms, the 
newcomer CEE elites have not yet developed strong emotional relations to the 
EU so the projective aspect of their Euroenthusiasm prevails. Correspondingly, it 
is understandable why in CEE only incumbency creates significant effects on the 
emotional dimension of Euroenthusiasm. In comparison, the WE elites are the oldest 
in the club and they lead the EU project. They therefore exhibit equilibrium on the 
emotion-projection scale of Euroenthusiasm. Meanwhile, the emotional relation to 
the EU of SE elites – less well-established members of the EU – is more malleable, 
especially since the 2008 crisis that spurred a wave of strong negative emotions 
related to feelings of unfair EU decision-making at the cost of nation-state interests. 
These observations along the emotional-projective dimensions of Euroenthusiasm 
allow us to speculate about the deeply engrained regional characteristics of the 
Europeanness of elites and their constituencies. We take note of post-communist 
pragmatism and eagerness to develop a new European project-related identity. In 
parallel, we also observe the effects of what is popularly called ‘Southern European 
emotionality’ which in our analytical framework invites us to highlight the 
importance of 2008 crisis on the creation of negative emotions and hurt nation-state 
feelings in the social construction and maintenance of Europeanness. Finally, we 
are aware of the balanced nature of WE Euroenthusiasm that combines on the one 
hand highly politicized assessments of the need to (and interest in) strengthen(ing) 
EU institutions and supranationalize its policies and, on the other hand, a lively 
emotional texture of positive and negative feelings stemming from deeply ingrained 
and newly layered experiences with the EU. 
Finally, the effects of European socialization on Euroenthusiasm in CEE also 
invite emphasis of the emotional dimension. These positive effects, found for the 
emotional aspect of Euroenthusiasm, show – as postulated by Schimmelfennig 
(2005) – that Europeanness and feelings of fairness in the decision-making of 
the EU are acquired and boosted “on the ground” via everyday experiences and 
communication. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The empirical study described in this paper shows that during the 2008 crisis 
the Euroenthusiasm of national political elites underwent changes which relate 
to more general than idiosyncratic country characteristics. We reveal that, even 
though poor overall economic performance increased negative and decreased 
positive dimensions of EU framing, economic factors explain only a part of 
the story. Counter-intuitively, and as observed by (Teney 2016), the economic 
crisis of 2008 augmented certain aspects of national elites’ Euroenthusiasm, 
especially in the cases of the ongoing politicization of the EU (in WE), and 
of the enduring pragmatic pro-European orientation in CEE. Our findings also 
resonate with compelling emerging European research that demonstrates that 
the role of emotion should be a primary focus of attention. Moreover, the present 
research raises new research questions, regarding not only the (perceptions of 
and support for) the supranationalization of redistributive policies in the EU, but 
also the issues of foreign affairs and security policies, conceptualized along, on 
the one hand, shifting geopolitical concerns, and on the other, post-materialist 
considerations. 
Methodologically, additional data would validate our research findings. In 
particular, and despite the fact that we do not have any significant reason to 
question the validity of elites’ answers that are pertinent to political culture, 
deeper study of national electoral party manifestos and the analysis of 
political discourse would help to better address the issue of national elites’ 
political partisanship and its relation to Euroenthusiasm. Such longitudinal, 
triangulated, comparative research, encompassing not only national political 
elites, but also ordinary citizens, may well substantiate the major findings 
of the present study, thereby highlighting persistent regional patterns of 
Europeanness.  
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